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Comments
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In his recent.JEParticle, Theodore Bergstrom
(Spring 2002, pp. 67-88) joins a small but

210
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distinguished group of economists who have
seriously considered the implications of group
selection for the conduct of economic inquiry
and the assumptions we make about human nature. Until recently, this group has essentially
been limited to Gary Becker, Friedrich Hayek,
Jack Hirshleifer and Paul Samuelson. Each of
these has not only acknowledged the possibility
of group level selection (uncontroversial among
biologists), but more significantly, has written
sympathetically about the possibility that this
variant of natural selection has left lasting imprints on human behavioral predispositions.
This note is concerned with one specific claim
in Bergstrom's article, however, which I think is
wrong or, at best, misleading: the claim that in
"haystack"models, group composition must be
assortative in order for group selection to attain
any traction.
The intuition behind Bergstrom's "theorem"
is clear. If altruists interact with defectors, they
will have relatively fewer offspring than the defectors at any moment in time. Only if group
composition is assortative, requiring that altruists have some way of seeking each other out and
differentially associating with each other, can
they benefit from their shared altruism and gain
in a way that would increase the proportion of
altruistic offspring in the population.
In haystack models, populations separate into
groups or demes for one or several generations
before merging and then reassorting. Bergstrom's logic is premised on the assumption of
very large numbers in the individual groups. He
argues that if the overall population is large and
groups are "formed by random sampling without replacement from this population, then
matching will be almost nonassortative" (p. 71).
My claim is that the assumption of very large
numbers is unrealistic if it is intended to apply to
any actual demographic situation under which
group selection might apply. Why does this matter? If the numbers are small, random variation
alone will almost certainly produce variation in
the percentages of altruists within each group.
Bergstrom, in fact, acknowledges this: "In haystack models, random group formation produces some groups with more cooperators than
others" (p. 71). So long as there is some variation in these frequencies, so that altruists are in
some cases grouped together, group selection
has the potential to act in a manner that causes
the frequency of altruists in the general population to rise. This can happen even if the altruists
are declining in each and every group at any
moment of time-as long as the groups with
relatively more altruists have a greater number
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of total offspring. And it can happen even
though there is no mechanism whereby altruists
seek out others similarly inclined and try to join
groups differentially composed of them.
My point is related to that used to account for
genetic drift, and is based on the statistical properties of small samples. If you flip a true coin,
there is a 50:50 chance of getting a head or a tail.
It does not follow, however, that if you choose
groups of 10, you will always end up with five
heads and five tails. The larger the size of the
group, of course, the smaller will be the variance
of the actual population shares around a mean
of a fifty-fiftysplit. But a variance will remain.
Suppose mutation or genetic recombination
has created a small number of altruistically inclined individuals. We are concerned with
whether natural selection can allow these genes
to persist. Suppose these individuals comprise
10 percent of the total population. Let n = 100
and have the population assort periodically into
10 equally sized haystacks. It is quite unlikely
that each group will end up with nine defectors
and one altruist. Perhaps the ten haystacks
would include one that contains three altruistic
individuals, one that contains two, five that contain one and three haystacks that contain none.
Where small numbers are involved, random variation will produce a variation in trait frequency
within groups that produces an outcome that to
the untrained eye might in fact look as if there
had been some tendency for altruists to seek
each other out and associate with them. But the
process is essentially random.
This point matters because as it stands, Bergstrom's logic appears to require as a precondition for any operation of group selection that
individuals be armed with machinery for seeking
out and differentially assorting with other cooperators. There is some experimental evidence
that we have in fact acquired these capabilities,
but to make it a precondition for the evolution
of altruism raises unnecessarily the hurdles that
group selection must overcome to be considered
a potentially serious influence on human nature. It faces enough of these as things stand.
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